












> N° 01/2008 
 
 
  The EU Council Presidency 



















 A. M. Fernàndez – The EU Council Presidency Dilemma: an Historical Institutionalist Interpretation 















ANA MAR FERNANDEZ 
 
 
The EU Council Presidency Dilemma:  












Citation : Ana Mar F ernàndez ( 2008), “Th e EU Council Presidenc y Dile mma: an  
Historical Institutionalist Interpretation”, Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po, n° 














The aim of this article is to demonstrate the usefulness of taking into account the 
variable of EU institutional  development when analysing the consequences of EU 
membership. Using an historical institutionalist perspective, the article examines the path of 
the Council Presidency since its origins and argues that five decades of institutional feedback 
have unexpectedly altered its nature. Originally conceived as an intergovernmental function, 
today the Presidency has become hybrid and increasingly identified with the Community 
interests. This process of institutional conversion has essentially limited the scope of action 
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Just over fifty years ago, six European states decided to embark on a common 
venture. In a Europe divided by the Iron Curtain, they chose to unite and to create a new kind 
of political organisation. The aim of this article is to improve the understanding of this atypical 
political system. It is an exercise to further understand the relationship between structure and 
agency within the European Union, and, in particular the structuring effect of the institutions 
on political actions. In this sense, the intention is to contribute to the academic debate on the 
implications of EU membership. The starting hypothesis lies in the claim that the evolution of 
the institutional system constitutes a variable with explanatory power that should be taken 
into account when analysing the consequences for states of being members of the EU. 
Researching the changes that the EU imposes on national executives involves focussing 
attention on the functioning of this political structure as well as considering its ever changing 
nature.  
 
I. Why the EU Council Presidency? 
 
In order to illustrate this idea, the case of the EU Council Presidency will be 
considered. The main reason to study it is related to a recurring debate in progress since the 
seventies regarding the scope of this function for the member states. The qualitative leap in 
the roles of the Presidency over the years has led various authors to question the 
implications of the exercise of the Presidency for member states that for six months on a 
periodic and rotational basis occupy this post. Starting from the analysis of the role of the 
Presidency in terms of organisation, impulsion, mediation and representation both within and 
outside the Union, several authors have tried to establish the level of responsibility and/or 
                                                 
1 The author is grateful to Simon Bulmer, Nuria Font, Johan P. Olsen, Sophie Vanhoonacker and Helen Wallace 
for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.  A. M. Fernàndez – The EU Council Presidency Dilemma: an Historical Institutionalist Interpretation 
political opportunity that the exercise of this function implies (Bengtsson et al., 2004; 
Edwards and Wallace, 1976; Elgström, 2003, Tallberg, 2006; Thomson, 2008). 
 
Three principal hypotheses have been formulated regarding this particular aspect. 
One part of the literature considers that the holding of the Presidency represents a great 
responsibility that does not however bring about any political power for the state concerned 
(Bassompierre, 1988; Dewost, 1984; Metcalfe, 1988; O’Nuallain, 1985). From this 
perspective,  the Presidency is a supranational function that involves placing national 
administrations at the service of the Union and subordinating the pursuit of national interests 
to that of common interest. Seen in this light, the Presidency is essentially a neutral and 
impartial role that prohibits political capitalisation, except for the prestige obtained as a result 
of a job well done.  
 
Another body of literature argues the contrary: that the Presidency is essentially an 
intergovernmental function (Ayral, 1975; Tallberg 2003 and 2004; Sherrington, 2000). From 
this perspective, the holding of the Presidency places the member states in a privileged 
position that allows them to guide the European agenda and to maximise their own interests. 
This second hypothesis that is anchored into a rationalist theoretical framework, questions 
the disinterested nature of the Presidency and highlights the level of discretional power 
inherent to its exercise.  
 
In contrast to these two principal approaches that highlight respectively the ‘silencer 
or amplifier’ character of the Presidency (Bengtsson et al., 2004), a third line of interpretation 
has emerged. This vision nuances the previous views and sustains that the presidential role 
combines both communitarian and intergovernmental components (Kirchner, 1992; Ludlow, 
1993; Wallace, 1986; Westlake, 1999; Schout, 1998). According to this vision, the 
Presidency is a complex role in which responsibility and opportunity are present at the same 
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time. As the prominent figure within the Council, and therefore as one of the main bridges 
between the supranational and intergovernmental dimensions of the Union, the Presidency 
implies a balancing act between the individual interests of national government and the 
general interests of the Community.  
 
This debate regarding the dilemma of the Presidency in terms of representation of 
interests is particularly interesting. Nevertheless, the approach used by scholars to contrast 
these suppositions is not completely satisfactory. The usual approach  to determine the 
competing or complementary expectations that arise from the tenure of the Presidency 
consists in analysing the current competencies of this institution. Existing studies centre the 
subject of the Presidency from the perspective of the power given to the member states and, 
in this way, focus on the mechanisms at the disposal of the Presidency to influence the 
European agenda (see Tallberg, 2006).  
 
This type of perspective, while useful, fails to address two previous and interrelated 
questions that are fundamental if we are to gauge the nature of this impact. In the first 
instance, what is the relative position occupied by the Council Presidency within the 
European institutional system? Secondly, to what extent this rank has been stable over time? 
In other words, how can we resolve the question of the implications of the Presidency for the 
agents of the political system in terms of representation of interests without establishing the 
scope of this institution within the overall system and considering the fact that the relative 
position of this institution has changed throughout the years? 
 
To sum up then, the main problem of the existing analyses resides in the static 
conception of the structure-agency relationship. While considerable efforts have been spent 
in scrutinizing the semesters and in comparing national performances (e.g. Elgström, 2003; 
Quaglia and Moxon-Browne, 2006; Svensson, 2000), little attention has been paid to the 
institutional variation of the Presidency over time. The evolution of the Presidency is 
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mentioned but institutional change as an explanatory factor of the actual scope of this 
function for the member states –the level of responsibility and/or opportunity that its exercise 
involves- is not considered. Taking this into account, this article claims for the need to situate 
the study of the structure-agency relationship within an historical perspective in order to fully 
understand the impact of the Presidency on the member states. More specifically, it argues 
that if there is no doubt that the presidential term of office constitutes an especially relevant 
moment in terms of the interaction between the European and the national spheres, it should 
however be stated that its effects have not always been the same. The scope of the 
Presidency for the member states has varied in function of the evolving position of this 
institution within the European system.    
 
 
II .The EU Council Presidency from the perspective of historical institutionalism: a 
win-win exercise 
  
The basic hypothesis is that the Council Presidency is not a constant variable. Five decades 
of institutional feedback have unexpectedly altered its nature and this process of institutional 
conversion has locked in the scope of action of the member states. In 1951, the Presidency 
had a low-profile, intergovernmental function. Its competences were limited and were 
basically administrative in nature. The functioning of the erstwhile Special Council of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was simple, with little formal organisation. In 
this context, the Presidency had a mostly symbolic importance for the member states. The 
presidential mandate did not involve either a great deal of responsibility or major 
organisational efforts, although on the other hand, it did provide a mechanism to ensure 
equal representation within the Council.  
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Fifty years later, things have changed. Five decades of institutional increasing return effects 
have considerably upgraded this institution and led to its progressive communitarisation. This 
office no longer represents a mere administrative role identified with the defence of 
intergovernmental interests.  It has become a complex exercise that is increasingly 
associated with the defence of community interests.  Historical institutionalism is the 
approach used to confirm this hypothesis.  
 
The usefulness of this theory lies fundamentally in the theoretical importance 
attributed to the time factor, and, more specifically, to the historical trajectory of institutional 
options (e.g. Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Pierson, 2004). This 
school of neo-institutionalism accepts the realist premise that the starting point of institutional 
design is the rational choice of political actors, and proceeds to research the long-terms 
effects of the initial decision, stressing the contingent nature of such effects. From this 
approach, current political outcomes should be interpreted in the light of past institutional 
choices  (Bulmer, 1994; Krasner, 1984 and 1988; Thelen, 2003). The actors that create the 
institutions are, at the same time, conditioned by the development of the institutions 
themselves. The main feature of this evolution is its continuity or path dependency. The 
greater the time elapsed, the greater the difficulty involved in going back to the original 
choices and implementing alternative solutions, even if they are more efficient (Arthur, 1989; 
David, 1985). The amortization of the initial investment, the experience acquired and the co-
ordination with other institutions all produce inertias (Pierson, 1993). In this context, changes 
with regards to the original model tend to be limited and set in a pre-established pattern of 
development.  
 
  However, institutions do undergo substantial changes. To explain this, historical 
institutionalism uses the term of ‘critical juncture’, a concept that is similar to the 
‘performance crisis’ coined by March and Olsen in 1989, and is based on the idea of turning 
point in the development of a system. Profound changes are not frequent, while the catalyst 
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is to be found in the socio-political environment and takes the form of an event that is at once 
exceptional and crucial, with the result that the foundations are laid for a new path to be 
established (March and Olsen, 1984, 1989). Such a change in direction may involve the 
creation of norms and procedures that break, to a greater or lesser degree, with the 
institutional legacy of the past. The institutional transformation may be complete or partial, 
but it will contribute to the development of new models of representation and behaviour.  
 
Overall, by situating the structure-agency relationship in a dynamic and diachronic 
perspective, historical institutionalism allows us to shed light on the mechanisms of 
innovation, reproduction and institutional change as well as to make clear the impact of this 
evolution on the behaviour of political actors (Steinmo et al., 1992). In other words, the 
analytical importance attributed to the structure-agency dialectic over time allows us to 
sequentialize institutional development and to examine the evolution of the structuring effect 
of the institutions on political action. In this sense, it helps to show the long-term implications 
of institutional decisions.  
 
In the case of the Council Presidency, this approach is interesting because it allows 
us to trace the path of this institution since its creation; to identify the key moments that have 
marked its development; and to highlight both the role played by the member states in driving 
this process of change and its lock-in effect regarding the definition of future actions.  
 
The EU Council Presidency: Analysis of a changing nature 
 
Today, the Presidency continues to represent the main intergovernmental counterweight to 
the supranational dynamic embodied by the European Commission. Nevertheless, this 
institution has also become one of the driving forces of the European integration process, 
namely, an institution increasingly associated with the defence of collective views and the 
implementation of common policies. This unexpected change that may be described as the 
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“communitarisation” of the Council Presidency can be explained by the institutional choices 
made by the member states at decisive moments of European construction. 
 
1.  The creation of the Council Presidency as 
an intergovernmental guarantee 
 
The origin of the EU Council Presidency should be placed in the context of the political 
negotiations that presided over the creation of the first European Community. In 1951, the 
main concern of the founder states was centred on the autonomy of the High Authority 
(Dinan, 2004, p.51; Houben, 1964). The idea contemplated in the Schuman Declaration to 
create a supranational institution that would be independent of national governments caused 
misgivings among the contracting parties and in particular among the Benelux States who 
would finally condition their participation in the European project to the creation of a Council 
of Ministers that would institutionalise member state participation in the Community structure 
(Poidevin and Spierenburg, 1993, p.13; Rittberger, 2001, p.695). This was the source of a 
hybrid political system based on the principle of institutional balance. The power of the High 
Authority, the forum of the representation of the general interest of the Community, was 
counterbalanced by the creation of a Special Council of Ministers, a body of collective control 
and centre of member-state interests (De Visscher, 1957, p.23; Kersten, 1988, p.293).  
 
The Presidency of the EU Council finds its origins in this context characterised by the will to 
organise the conditions of state participation in the communitarian enterprise. Its beginnings 
were modest in terms of competencies but important from a symbolic and political point of 
view. Effectively, the Presidency was then designed as a double institutional guarantee. On 
the one hand, it represented governmental interests within the communitarian structure, 
which at that time allowed for the powerful figure of Jean Monnet, first president of the High 
Authority, to be counterbalanced. On the other hand, it also guaranteed the equal 
representation of the member states  within  the Council (Dumoulin, 1988, p.272). The 
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conditions regarding how the Presidency would be attributed and exercised could be 
summed up in terms of two key principles: representation and equality. Both were set out in 
Art. 27 of the Treaty of the ECSC and were considered to be, until recently, non-negotiable 
by the small states of the Union. This system, whose precedent was Art.IV of the Internal 
Rules of Procedure of the Council of the League of Nations of 1933, involved two ideas. 
Firstly, the fact that the Presidency would be assumed by the member states and not by a 
collective representative. Secondly, the idea that each member state would exercise this 
function periodically on a rotating basis, regardless of its demographic size or economic and 
political power (Di Bucci, 1988, p.5). During this first stage, the rotation sequence was fixed 
by the alphabetic order of the member states in the French language
2. By choosing an 
institutional design based on the principles of representativeness and equality, the founding 
states ensured a national profile for the Presidency, in contrast to the communitarian profile 
of the Presidency of the High Authority. This was also foreseen by the Treaties of Rome
3, 
and was reinforced during the shift to intergovernmentalism in the 1960s.  
 
2.  The reproduction of the Council Presidency in the shadow 
of increasing intergovernmentalism 
 
The ‘sixties and ‘seventies marked the functional ‘take off’ of the Presidency. Events such as 
the Luxembourg Compromise in 1966, the creation of European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
on an intergovernmental basis in 1970 or the institutionalisation of the meetings between the 
Heads of State and Governments through the creation of the European Council in 1974 
activated the potential of the Presidency as well as strengthened its intergovernmental 
character. 
                                                 
2 According to this rule, the first meeting of the Special Council of Ministers that was held in Luxembourg on 8 
September 1952 was presided over by Konrad Adenauer.  
3 By way of example, during the negotiations surrounding the Treaties of Rome, the Benelux countries, and in 
particular Luxembourg, strongly defended their “participation in the steering organs of the Councils of the EEC 
and Euratom”. See Note of Luxembourg Delegation of 13th September delivered to the negotiating commission 
led by Paul-Henri Spaak. Doc. 271/56. Quoted in Spaak, 1987, p. 68. A. M. Fernàndez – The EU Council Presidency Dilemma: an Historical Institutionalist Interpretation 




The first great impulse in terms of responsibilities of the Presidency occurred after the 
election of Charles de Gaulle to the Presidency of the fifth French Republic in January 1959. 
Critical of the supranational thesis of the Founding Fathers that gave the power of political 
initiative to the Commission, De Gaulle called for the central role for states in the European 
system (De Gaulle, 1971, p.1030; Palayret et al., 2007). From the perspective of the Council 
Presidency, the struggle for a European model based on mechanisms of cooperation 
between states instead of transfers of sovereignty to a supranational institution that reached 
its highest point with the institutional crisis of 1965 and with the adoption of the Luxembourg 
Compromise in January 1966 had a noteworthy result: the end of the monopoly of the 
Commission in terms of external representation of the European Communities and  its 
substitution by a dual system based on the idea of the right to active and passive legation 
shared between the President of the Commission and the Council President
4.  
 
The second qualitative leap in the powers of the Presidency came about as a result of the 
adoption of the Davignon and Copenhagen Reports on 27 October 1970 and 23 July 1973 
respectively. By opting to create and develop the EPC mechanism on an intergovernmental 
formula, the member states transformed the scope of the Presidency within the European 
system. Apart from extending its responsibilities in administrative areas, the Presidency’s 
political potential was activated in that the initiative, mediation and executive powers granted 
by the treaties to the Commission in the communitarian field were similarly granted to the 
Presidency in intergovernmental matters. Moreover, the lack of agreement on the creation of 
a permanent secretary’s office in this area converted the Presidency into the only structural 
support of the EPC until the Single European Act (SEA).  
 
                                                 
4 This change that is contemplated in the Annex II of the Luxembourg Compromise that deals specifically with the 
question of the relations between the Council of Ministers and the Commission was the direct result of the 
Decalogue presented on 17 January 1966 by the French Government (see Historic Archives of the Council, CM 
2/1966).   A. M. Fernàndez – The EU Council Presidency Dilemma: an Historical Institutionalist Interpretation 
These changes that have been driven by the member states in order to counterbalance the 
supranational dynamic of the European integration process implied an unprecedented 
challenge for the administrations periodically involved (partly due to the functional 
differentiation established between EC affairs and EPC matters) as well as a new role of 
political leadership. Since the seventies, the success or failure of the presidential term began 
to depend on political criteria as well as its capacity to make proposals, negotiate and find 
formulae of consensus in the intergovernmental domain (De Schoutheete, 1980, p.43).   
 
In this sense, the creation of the European Council in December 1974 should also be 
highlighted. The institutionalisation of the Conferences of Heads of States and Governments 
that had taken place without a fixed timetable since 1961 endowed the European building 
with a superstructure (Brückner, 1982, p.60; Bulmer and Wessels, 1987). This change had 
an important consequence for the Presidency in that it meant that the existing presidential 
model of the Community and the EPC pillars were transferred to the highest organ of the 
European system. This new desire of the member states for a single presidency once more 
transformed the scope of the institution. It granted the Presidency the responsibility of 
representing the European Council outside as well as within the European Communities and 
of preparing materially and politically all its meetings.  
 
3. The conversion of the Council Presidency: 
the communitarisation of an intergovernmental function 
 
For decades, the Presidency was essentially conceived as an intergovernmental 
counterweight to the supranational dynamic embodied by the European Commission. As 
Wallace pointed out, the design of the EC rested on an institutional balance between two 
levels of governance -the Community with the Commission, advocate of collective interests, 
and the national with the Council –and thus the Presidency- forum of the member states 
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(Wallace, 2002, p.328). Since the middle of the eighties, this clear-cut pattern in terms of role 
conception has changed. Two main factors can be identified that have transformed in 
particular the Council Presidency into one that is increasingly concerned with Community 
interests: the reactivation of the supranational dynamic since the eighties and the institutional 
reform process that has accompanied the latest and largest enlargement of the EU. 
 
Conditioning Factors (I): The re-launch of the European integration process after 
the SEA 
 
After many years in which intergovernmentalism had dominated, the European integration 
process found a new lease of life with the signing of the SEA in 1986 and of the European 
Union Treaty (TEU) in 1992. The dynamics created by these first two reforms of the founding 
treaties had an unprecedented effect on the growth in the responsibilities of the Council 
Presidency in both the intergovernmental and the supranational ambit of the EU. This new 
assignment of tasks gave rise to an important and unexpected political consequence: the 
transformation of an institution traditionally considered to be a bastion of governmental 
interests within the Community structure into a driving force of the overall integration 
process. Despite the fact that, in practice, variations exist between countries, in formal terms 
– legal, procedural and political – there was a qualitative leap forward in the communitarian 
duties of the Council Presidency. This turning point is reflected in at least three missions that 
the member states granted at that time to the Presidency, and in the fact that, for the first 
time, with the formal introduction of semester programmes in January 1989 (in accordance 
with the Stuttgart Declaration of 1983), a results based obligation was introduced (EC 
Bulletin, 6-1983, p.26).  
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  The Responsibility for progress in the fields of CFSP and JHA 
Since the creation of EPC outside of the Community framework in 1970, the Council 
Presidency has assumed a central role in the development of the mechanisms of co-
ordination of the member states’ foreign policy (Rummel, 1982, p.159). The changes 
produced in the international scenario as a result of the end of the Cold War led to a 
speeding up of the development of political union. The member states decided to make a 
qualitative leap, transforming EPC into a common foreign policy that included the security 
dimension and the promotion of co-operation in judicial and home affairs that had been 
developing informally since the constitution of the Trevi Group in 1975. 
 
The Council Presidency emerged notably strengthened from both processes. As David 
Galloway points out, the CFSP and JHA became complex frameworks of co-ordination and 
consultation led by the Presidency (Galloway, 1999, p.211). Title V and VI of the Maastricht 
treaty not only granted it the power to propose initiatives and to represent the Union in the 
field of the Second and Third Pillars of the EU but also notably extended its executive duties 
in the ambit of the implementation of the joint positions and actions related to these areas. 
This strengthening of the political role of the Presidency, together with the accession of 
Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 –three ‘small’ and neutral countries- had an important 
consequence from the point of view of the functioning of the Presidency: the end of the 
alternated alphabetic system adopted after the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986, and 
the establishment of a new order of rotation based on political criteria (Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace, 2006, p.139). 
 
 
  The responsibility for achieving the Internal Market and EMU 
Since the middle of the eighties, the Presidency has acquired an increasingly central role in 
the direction of the European integration process not only from an intergovernmental 
perspective but also from a supranational one. The member states added a new dimension 
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to the Presidency by making it jointly responsible with a reactivated Commission for the 
implementation of the Internal Market and for Economic and Monetary Union (Armstrong and 
Bulmer, 1998, p.77). One of the most immediate consequences of this decision was a 
revised working relationship between the Council Presidency and the Commission. The 
rather conflictive nature that for years had characterised relations between both institutions 
as a result of the adoption of the Luxembourg Compromise gave way to a new climate of 
cooperation based on reinforced joint responsibility for the implementation of common 
policies.  An example of this legally inducted synergy was the presentation of a joint strategy 
by the Luxembourg, British and Austrian presidencies in 1997-1998 in order to develop the 
Commission’s Single Market Action Plan 1997-1999 (CSE (97) 1 final, 4 June 1997). 
 
This was reinforced by the re-introduction and extension of qualified majority voting in the 
Council. As a high-level official of the Council General Secretariat pointed out, “the formal 
generalisation of this voting method in economic integration potentially transformed the 
Council Presidency into one of the principal allies of the European Commission” (Interview, 
Brussels, 09/11/04). The advances made towards the Single Market and EMU depended on 
the success of the vote in the Council. This, in turn, was conditioned to a large extent to the 
capacity of the President to construct a majority (Tallberg, 2006, p.60; Westlake, 1999, p. 
43).   
 
  The Responsibility for assuring coherence between economic 
integration and political union 
Finally here, a third element should be highlighted that contributed to the strengthening of the 
centrality of the Presidency at the heart of the European institutional system, and  that also 
supports the hypothesis that the Presidency has increasingly taken on board supranational 
interests: the institutionalisation of its link between the two functional dynamics of the EU. 
Until the SEA was passed, the Council Presidency constituted an informal bridge between 
the process towards economic integration taking place within the three European 
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Communities, and the mechanism of Political Co-operation based on intergovernmentalism, 
which remained outside the legal framework of the Treaties. On granting a single framework 
to these two dimensions of European construction, the SEA took an important step forward 
towards closing the gap between these two systems, reflecting changes of attitudes of 
certain member states such as France, who up until then had sought to keep the two 
dynamics separate. In 1992, the Maastricht treaty formalised the creation of a European 
Union that included the Community pillar and the two intergovernmental pillars of European 
construction. Based on Art. C of Title I on Common Dispositions of the Maastricht Treaty, it 
was the mission of both the Commission and the Council to guarantee the coherence and 
continuity of all of the actions of the EU, as well as to ensure co-operation between the two 
institutions in this field. For the Council’s part, the Presidential role was to ensure the 
coherence between the activities of the three Pillars of the Union and the coordination of this 
objective with the Commission. 
 
Overall, the change of direction produced in the construction process since the mid-
eighties has had an impact on the Council Presidency. The re-launch of the Community 
contributed to give this institution a new responsibility toward European integration, and 
consequently in defence of the general interests of the Union. The recent evolution of the 
integration process and in particular that of institutional reform which began in the mid-
nineties in the context of the fifth enlargement of the EU and of the debate on the future of 
Europe confirms this tendency. 
 
Conditioning Factors (II): The institutional reform in the face of enlargement and 
the debate on the future of Europe 
 
Since the implosion of the Soviet block in 1991 and the end of the bipolar order, 
Europe faced the greatest challenge of its recent history: the end of its division. For more 
than 10 years, the most important enlargement in economic, political and symbolic terms 
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centred the interests of the member states, although at the same time, it was a cause for 
concern. 
 
In institutional terms, there was little doubt about the need to adapt existing structures 
that had been constructed around just six member states. The main question consisted of 
deciding how to change without altering the fundamental nature of an originally complex 
mechanism that was both supranational and intergovernmental; in other words, how to 
continue to advance towards a closer union in a framework enlarged by ten new member 
states, that was efficient from a functional point of view and politically balanced. Such a 
complex issue called for wider reflection on the model and the objectives of the process of 
European integration. 
 
As Johan Olsen has claimed, the debate on the future of Europe has always been above all 
a debate on how Europe should be governed, how the powers of the principal communitarian 
institutions should be organised, distributed, executed and controlled in the widened political 
arena (Olsen, 2002, p.922). This process of reflection and negotiation on the levels of the 
respective powers and on the rules of the European political game has lasted for nearly a 
decade. During all of these years, one of the most interesting and controversial questions 
that has arisen has been the reform of the rotational presidential system. 
 
This was not a new issue. Since the dawn of European construction, there have been 
various attempts to reform a model afflicted by a central problem: the lack of continuity. As 
the powers of the president have been extended, the issue of rotation, first by trimester 
(1951-1957) and then by semester (1958- ) has been increasingly called into question. The 
main difficulty of introducing substantial modifications in the actual system has always 
stemmed from the firm support given by the member states, and particularly of the smaller 
ones, to the fundamental principles of the Presidency: representation and equality. Thus, for 
years the proposed reforms have sought to maintain the rotational system on the one hand 
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and, on the other, to introduce measures to improve the continuity of the Councils’ work and 
also, since 1974, that of the European Council. In this sense, the unsuccessful Tindemans 
Report proposed to maintain the rotational system, while increasing the duration of the 
mandate to a period of a year. The proposal adopted in 1981 by the European Council in 
London was more successful in that it created a European troika in political co-operation to 
achieve a better level of coordination between the current, previous and forthcoming 
Presidency. The progressive reinforcement of the figure of Secretary-General of the Council 
as a means of support to the Presidency has to be interpreted in the same way. 
 
However, the challenge of enlargement has speeded up the necessity for reform. In this 
context, since the middle of the nineties, two parallel processes set to improve the workings 
of the Council have been taking place. On the one hand, since 1999, the General Council 
Secretariat has issued several proposals that have led to five reforms of the Council’s Rules 
of Procedure in less than six years
5. On the other hand, there is the process of negotiation 
on this same subject that occurred in the frame of both the Convention and of the IGC 
2003/2004 for the revision of the treaties. 
 
  The reform of the Presidency in the framework of the current Treaties 
In March 1999, after the failure of the Treaty of Amsterdam on the institutional 
adaptation of the Union in the face of enlargement, the previous General-Secretary of the 
Council Jürgen Trumpf presented a comprehensive list on “the workings of the Council from 
the perspective of an enlarged Europe” (SN 2139/99). The document went over all the 
organisational and functional aspects of the Council and the European Council, and noted 
more than 140 ideas to guarantee that both institutions would continue to function efficiently 
after enlargement. One of the priorities identified to improve the working methods of the 
Council consisted of correcting the lack of continuity inherent in the rotating presidency.  
                                                 
5 Between 1951 and 1969, the Council’s Rules of Procedure had only been modified twice: in 1957 due to the 
signing of the Treaties of Rome and in 1969 due the adoption of the definitive Council’s Rules of Procedure.  A. M. Fernàndez – The EU Council Presidency Dilemma: an Historical Institutionalist Interpretation 
The first specific measures in this direction were adopted during the European 
Council of Helsinki (10 and 11 December 1999) in which two operational recommendations 
were taken on board with the aim of consolidating the leading position of the Presidency and 
of improving the coherence of its work: the presence of the forthcoming Presidency in 
Community issues and global assistance of the Secretariat-General of the Council 
(00300/1/99).  
 
As Javier Solana, appointed as Secretary-General of the Council in October 1999, pointed 
out in two successive reports presented at the European Council in June (Gothenburg) and 
December (Laeken) 2001, these first reforms were insufficient. The working practices of the 
Council continued to present important deficiencies in terms of effectiveness and 
coordination. The result of this pessimistic evaluation was the presentation of a new 
document in March 2002 in which three formulae were contemplated in order to increase the 
powers of the Presidency: a mandate extended to two or three semesters and the reform of 
the rotational system, whereby it would be substituted with a combined Presidency, a 
collegiate body made up of groups of five or six member states on a rotational basis and with 
a mandate of two and a half years. Finally, in order to strengthen the image of the EU 
abroad, the report proposed that the president of the European Council should be elected for 
a period of two and a half years (S 0044/02).  
 
Following the recommendations of Solana, the European Council of Seville (21 and 
22 June 2002) adopted some of these measures, specifying that “any adaptation of the 
current system of rotation by semester should continue to respect the principle of equality 
among all the member states” (13463/02). Within this clearly established framework, various 
new developments were introduced. The first concerned the issue of the programming of 
Council activities. In his report, the Secretary-General had proposed to extend the 
programme of the Presidency over two or three semesters. The European Council went 
much further than this, in finally giving its support to a proposal put forward by the Spanish 
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Presidency, which contemplated the idea of a programme extended over various years 
(9939/02). The formula finally approved was the strategic multi-annual programme extended 
to three years from December 2003, as well as the presentation of an annual operational 
programme of activities in December of each year
6. These proposals were introduced in the 
new Council’s Rules of Procedure which came into force on 23 July 2002, together with other 
changes, such as the reinforcement of the co-operation mechanisms between successive 
presidencies (Arts. 19 and 20), and the attribution of the Chair of certain working groups to 
the General Secretariat of the Council
7.   
 
Overall, the European Council of Seville marked a milestone in the process of reform 
of the Presidency. The measures discussed confirmed a change of direction in the 
evolutionary path of the Presidency. The ideas of a multi-annual programme, of partially co-
presided mandates and the delegation of the Presidency of certain working groups to the 
General Secretariat of the Council have involved a break with the initial format of the 
Presidency. In Seville, the principle of equality was maintained, but that of representation and 
uniqueness have been modified. Such changes, that were introduced to improve the 
functioning of the Council, reformed the founding principles of the Presidency. 
 
  The reform of the Presidency in the context of the European Convention on  
Treaty Reform 
This evolution has been confirmed by the results of the European Convention and of 
the IGC 2003/2004 on the revision of the Treaties. For almost three years a broad debate 
has developed concerning the future of the Union. During the work of the Convention, 
traditionally conflictual subjects such as the size and composition of the Commission, or the 
definition and area of application of the majority vote were once again placed on the table. At 
the same time, the introduction of new questions on the agenda of negotiation, such as the 
                                                 
6 In December 2002, Greece and Italy presented the first operational programme (15881/02).    
7 Working Groups of “Electronic Communications”, “Legal Data Processing”, “Codification of Legislation”, 
“Information”, “New Buildings”.  A. M. Fernàndez – The EU Council Presidency Dilemma: an Historical Institutionalist Interpretation 
election of the President of the European Council, the creation of the role of Foreign Affairs 
Minister of the Union (result of the merging of the High Representative for the CFSP and the 
Commissioner for External Relations), or the designation of a stable presidency for the 
Ecofin Council and the Council of Home and Justice Affairs raised a great deal of 
controversy. These proposals made by the larger states of the Union contributed to raising 
suspicions on the part of the Commission that such a government sought to ‘take over the 
government of Europe’. At the same time, as was to be expected, the Benelux States 
reacted adversely, given their traditional opposition to the introduction of any modification in 
the presidential rotational system likely to alter the balance between the states in the 
institutional structure of the EU (De Schoutheete and Wallace, 2002). 
 
The results of the Convention were presented to the European Council of Salonica 
(20 June 2003). From the point of view of the Presidency, despite the doubts raised, the 
Constitution project presented by Giscard D’Estaing finally contemplated the formula of the 
election of a President of the European Council by a majority of its members for a mandate 
of two and a half years, renewable only once, as well as the creation of the role of Foreign 
Affairs Minister of the EU. In other areas, the Constitutional project maintained the rotational 
presidential system but proposing to extend the mandate to a one year period.  
 
Despite being a compromise solution, the measures drawn up by the Constitutional 
project marked a new turn in the evolutionary path of the Council Presidency that had been 
confirmed by the results of the IGC 2003/2004, the adoption of the European Constitution by 
the Heads of State and Government on 29 October 2004 and the new Reform Treaty project 
(October 2007). The constitutional Treaty included the principle of the election of the 
President of the European Council by a qualified majority for a period of two and a half years, 
renewable only once. Such a measure, confirmed by the ICG 2007 results, has various 
consequences. On the one hand, it detaches the Presidency of the Council from the 
Presidency of the European Council, therefore putting an end to the system in place since 
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1974, when the latter was created. On the other, it implies designating as the head of the 
European Council a person who, on not having a national mandate, will appear, at least in 
theory, as a supra partes figure and no longer as a primus inter pares. Finally, and despite 
the attempts of the Benelux states (see IGC 53/03), the European Constitution made no 
mention of the Presidency of the European Council being designated on a rotational basis 
involving strict equality between member states. Thus, the principle of equality that had until 
that moment been in force was eliminated at a stroke.  
 
Secondly, the Constitutional Treaty institutionalised the Foreign Affairs Minister, 
appointed for a five year term, who would, inter alia, chair the Foreign Affairs Council for a 
period of five years. This new figure, which has been re-called the ‘High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ in the Reform Treaty project in an attempt 
to downplay all reminiscence to state vocabulary in the new text, would also be the vice-
president of the European Commission. With this measure, the Constitution not only 
suppressed the rotational system of semesters based on the principles of equality and 
representation (given that, on the date that the modified Treaty comes into place, this 
function would fall to the Secretary-General of the Council), but also contributed to 
communitarise the External Relations Council. This dual role of the new High Representative 
would effectively involve the difficult task of juggling the intergovernmental interests of the 
Council with the supranational interests of the Commission. In addition, the Constitution 
considered the strengthening of the measures agreed in Seville for the rest of the Council 
formations. In contrast to what the Convention had proposed, it maintained the rotational 
system by semesters but within a team presidency made up of three countries, therefore 
pushing the idea of a combined mandate
8. The Treaty also allowed the General Secretariat 
of the Council to take over the Presidency of more working groups in the future. Lastly, the 
                                                 
8 In December 2005, the Council adopted a new order of rotation for the period between January 2007 and June 
2018 that introduced this change. The new system organizes the member states into geographically and 
economically balanced groups of three, combining the ‘longstanding’ members of the EU with the ten countries 
who became members in 2004 (Official Journal of the EU, L 328/61, 15 December 2005).  
 A. M. Fernàndez – The EU Council Presidency Dilemma: an Historical Institutionalist Interpretation 
constitutional text introduced the possibility of modifying by majority the means of attributing 
the Presidency and its tenure.  
 
With these measures, the constitutional Treaty not only reorganised the Council 
Presidency, and as such had an impact on its way of working, but also affected symbolic 
issues tied to the underlying values of the Presidency that have endured since its origins. 
The new Reform Treaty seems to confirm this shift. In the case of ratification, these 
dispositions would involve the end of an age and a system; indeed they undermine the 
principles of equality, representation and uniqueness that have been inherent in the role of 
the Presidency since 1951. In this respect, they represent a departure in the system of 
representation of the member states within the European polity. They entail renouncing a 
privileged channel of influence in the European arena, while at the same time they involve 
the loss of an important instrument of socialisation to the communitarian interest.  
 
In summary, between the Presidency of the Special Council of the first European 
Community of 1951 and the Presidency of the Council of the Union of 2007, fifty years have 
gone by in which much more than the name has changed. The Presidency has been 
transformed. This evolution has been contingent and multidirectional. Contingent because 
the roles of the Presidency have been determined by the same evolutionary process of 
European integration, and more specifically by the underlying institutional debate that has 
characterized it since its origins. Multidirectional since in little more than half a century, the 
presidential mandate is no longer a role of administrative manager and spokesman of state 
interests in the heart of the Community, but rather has become a complex role of drive, 
coordination, negotiation, mediation and representation both in the supranational and 
intergovernmental areas of the Union.  
 
This evolution has transformed the meaning of the Presidency for the member states. 
In functional terms, the increasing importance of the role of the Presidency since the 
Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 01/2008 
 
24A. M. Fernàndez – The EU Council Presidency Dilemma: an Historical Institutionalist Interpretation 
seventies has been matched by the increase in the responsibilities of the member states 
both inside and outside the Union, which means that the challenge also increases for the 
administrations involved. On a politically symbolic level, the evolutionary dynamic of the 
Presidency has contributed to partially detach this figure from its founding logic related to the 
conflictive dialectic between the Council and the Commission. The presidential mandate has 
become a complex balancing challenge based on the compatibility of interests and the sum 
of identities. Proof of this is that, today, the main success of a Presidency does not derive 
form the capacity to slow down the European construction process, but rather from efforts to 




In this article, the objective has been to demonstrate the relevance of placing the 
analysis of the structure-agencies relationship in a historical perspective and to validate the 
idea that the evolution of the institutional system constitutes an explanatory variable to bear 
in mind when analysing the implications of EU membership. To test this hypothesis, attention 
has centred on the Council Presidency. This case study illustrates the evolving character of 
the European institutions, the role assumed by the member states in driving this process of 
change and also its lock-in effect regarding the definition of future actions. The aim was to 
demonstrate that the significance of the Presidency for the member states has varied 
throughout the process of European integration in accordance with the transformation of this 
institution and that such transformation has been driven by the institutional decisions taken 
by the member states at critical points in the history of European construction.  
 
Once this has been done, a conclusion has been reached that, indeed, the 
implications of hosting the Presidency have not always been the same. In 1951, the 
Presidency had an intergovernmental function with a low political profile. The ambits were 
limited and were essentially administrative. In the image of the then Special Council, the way 
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of working was simple and its organisation reduced to the minimum. In this context, the 
scope of the Presidency for the Member states was above all of a symbolic nature. This 
presidential mandate involved neither a great deal of responsibility nor major organisational 
efforts, although, on the other hand, it did provide a mechanism to ensure equal 
representation within the Council.  
 
Fifty years later, things have changed. Today the Presidency has become a central 
pillar of the EU system. Five decades of increasing return effects  have managed to 
communitarise this institution and raise it to the level of motor of European integration. This 
change of nature has meant an exponential growth of Presidential functions and has 
simultaneously transformed the principles upon which this institution functioned for decades. 
The initial symbolism that surrounded the Presidency has been eroded. What was conceived 
as a purely intergovernmental function has become hybrid and increasingly identified with 
communitarian interests.   
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